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"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED:" THE REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN LIVING WITH HIVIAIDS 
Lisa M. Keelst 
Women living with HIV I AIDS are frequently marginalized because 
of gender, health status, and, often, socioeconomic class. This 
Article explores the tension between the law and reproductive rights 
of women living with HIVIAIDS by analyzing both legal precedents 
and the evolving public health understanding of HIV I AIDS and 
reproduction. Of pivotal importance is the 1998 United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott,1 which, while 
providing protection for people with HIV I AIDS under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), inadvertently served to 
perpetuate a damaging stigma against women with HIV I AIDS who 
choose to reproduce. 
This Article explores the societal and legal consequences of 
Bragdon and examines the way in which the law is out of step with 
medical advancements regarding HIV I AIDS treatment and mother-
to-child transmission. The Article also considers obstacles women 
with HIV I AIDS face in medical contexts and their impact on the 
choice to reproduce, while proposing measures to ameliorate these 
problems. Finally, the Article considers the potential implications of 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) and how it may 
influence courts' future interpretations of Bragdon. It also discusses 
why Congress, when passing the ADAAA, should have explicitly 
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addressed Bragdon to combat the stigma surrounding HIV I AIDS and 
reproduction. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, a woman was six months pregnant in New York City.2 
She went to her normally scheduled prenatal appointment and was 
tested for HIV.3 She discovered that she not only had HIV but full-
blown AIDS, having only six CD4 cells.4 Panicked, her obstetrician 
initially did not feel comfortable treating her in this condition. 5 The 
woman then attempted to see an HIV I AIDS physician, and, after 
sitting in the waiting room for hours, she was informed that the 
doctor would not treat her because she was pregnant. 6 Ultimately, 
with the help of a community-based organization, an infectious 
disease specialist collaborated with the woman's obstetrician and, 
together, they administered the proper prenatal and postnatal protocol 
to prevent perinatal, or mother-to-child, transmission.7 After a course 
of antiretroviral (ARV) therapy and a caesarean section procedure, 
the woman delivered a healthy, HIV-negative child.8 While this 
woman eventually received appropriate medical treatment, the 
obstacles she overcame stem from a stigma surrounding HIV I AIDS 
and reproduction. 
Eleven years earlier, in 1998, the Supreme Court decided Bragdon 
v. Abbott/ taking seemingly progressive steps to prevent this very 
type of discrimination from occurring-discrimination against people 
living with HIV I AIDS by denying them appropriate medical 
treatment. 10 In Bragdon, Sidney Abbott, a woman living with HIV, 
brought an action against her dentist, Randon Bragdon, under the 
ADA, 11 because Bragdon refused to treat her in his office. 12 After the 
2. Telephone Interview with Michelle Lopez, Treatment Educator, Cmty. Healthcare 
Network of New York City (Dec. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Lopez Interview]. 
3. /d. 
4. /d. CD4 cells, also known as T cells, are part of the immune system that defends 
against infection. When a person's CD4 cell count drops below 200, that person's 
HIV has developed into AIDS. See Dep't of Health and Human Servs.: Ctrs. for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Living with HIVIAIDS, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/ 
resourceslbrochures/livingwithhiv.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
5. See Lopez Interview, supra note 2. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. /d. 
9. 524 u.s. 624 (1998). 
10. See generally id. at 637, 641-46 (using a number of different sources to confirm that 
HIV is a handicap that warrants statutory coverage). 
11. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1990). 
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lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of Abbott, 13 
Bragdon appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear 
the case!4 The case posed two questions: (1) was Abbott's HIV-
positive status considered a disability under the ADA?; 15 and, if so, 
(2) could Bragdon have refused treatment if her HIV posed a "'direct 
threat to the health or safety of others[?]'"16 The Court, in an opinion 
delivered by Justice Kennedy, held that Abbott's HIV-positive status, 
although asymptomatic at the time, was considered a disability under 
the ADA because it was "a physical ... impairment that substantially 
limit[ed] one or more of [her] major life activities."17 
The Bragdon Court easily found that HIV was considered a 
physical impairment under the regulations issued by the Department 
of Health and Human Services. 18 However, in order to rise to the 
level of a disability under the ADA, the impairment had to 
substantially limit a major life activity. 19 After a lengthy analysis, the 
Court subscribed to Abbott's argument that her HIV -positive status 
substantially limited her ability to reproduce, 20 and that reproduction 
12. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629. Bragdon informed Abbott "of his policy against filling 
cavities ofHIV-infected patients." !d. 
13. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment 
in favor ofp1aintiff, Abbott. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. 580, 584 (D. Me. 1995), 
aff'd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997). The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937, 949 
(1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
14. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628. 
15. /d. at 630-631. 
16. /d. at 648 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1990)). 
17. /d. at 630. The 1990 ADA provides other provisions under which a person may be 
considered to have a disability. In addition to having a physical impairment, one 
could have a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2005). A person could have a record of a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. /d. § 12102(2)(B). 
Moreover, if a person does not have a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits a major life activity, but that person is regarded as having such an impairment, 
the individual is considered to have a disability under the ADA. /d. § 12102(2)(C). 
18. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637. The Department of Health and Human Services' 
definition of "physical impairment" is the same as that in the regulations set forth by 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), issued in 1977, 
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which has largely been incorporated into 
the ADA. !d. at 632. 
19. See id. at 637. "The statute is not operative, and the definition not satisfied, unless the 
impairment affects a major life activity." !d. 
20. See id. at 641. Abbott testified that she chose not to have a child specifically because 
she had HIV. !d. 
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was a "major life activity" for purposes of the ADA.21 In his opinion, 
Justice Kennedy qualified the Court's holding by noting that, while 
the Court could have decided whether or not HIV substantially 
limited other major life activities, its proverbial hands were tied to 
decide the case on reproduction grounds specifically. 22 Justice 
Kennedy explained: 
Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course of the 
disease, its effect on major life activities of many sorts 
might have been relevant to our inquiry. [Abbott] and a 
number of amici make arguments about HIV's profound 
impact on almost every phase of the infected person's life. 
In light of these submissions, it may seem legalistic to 
circumscribe our discussion to the activity of reproduction. 
We have little doubt that had different parties brought the 
suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection 
imposes substantial limitations on other major life activities. 
From the outset, however, the case has been treated as one 
in which reproduction was the major life activity limited by 
the impairment. It is our practice to decide cases on the 
grounds raised and considered in the Court of Appeals and 
included in the question on which we granted certiorari.23 
The Court proceeded to deem reproduction a major life activity/4 
the crux of the case rested upon whether Abbott's physical 
impairment substantially limited reproduction. 25 By aligning itself 
with the statutory framework provided in the 1990 ADA/6 the 
Supreme Court held that the ADA protected Abbott because her HIV-
positive status substantially limited her ability to reproduce. 27 While 
Bragdon resulted in a fortuitous outcome, the reasoning behind it 
contributed to divergent lower court findings. 28 Moreover, Bragdon 
21. !d. at641. 
22. !d. at 637-38. 
23. !d. (citations omitted). 
24. !d. at 639. 
25. !d. at 639-40. 
26. See id. at 629-32. 
27. See id. at 624-25. 
28. See infra Part II. Compare Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc'ns, 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 
2002) (fmding that an HIV -positive male employee was not physically disabled under 
the ADA), with Teachout v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 04 Civ. 945 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 452022 (finding that a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude that HIV substantially limited a male employee's ability to reproduce). 
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inadvertently supported the notion that women with HIVIAIDS 
should not reproduce. 29 
This Article discusses how the Bragdon reproduction standard not 
only gave rise to legal inconsistencies but also allowed for further 
stigmatization of women with HIV I AIDS who choose to reproduce. 
This stigma has little basis in public health and perpetuates both 
gender and socioeconomic discrimination. Part IT of this Article 
discusses how Bragdon's reproduction standard influenced other 
courts to view ADA protection of people living with HIV I AIDS 
primarily in the context of reproduction, leading to divergent 
results.30 Part ill demonstrates how, regardless of lower courts' 
interpretations, the reproduction standard did not fully reflect public 
health reality in 1998 when Bragdon was decided. 31 Part IV 
addresses how Bragdon's framework has become more and more 
outdated in the context of current public health data. 32 Part V steeps 
the discussion of law and public health in reality, addressing the 
reasons why women with HIV I AIDS choose-or choose not-to 
reproduce and the social determinants of health that play a role in 
their medical care, or lack thereof. 33 It proceeds to propose 
collaborative efforts that could be made between HIVIAIDS 
physicians and obstetricians to provide optimal health care. Part VI 
discusses potential legal solutions, and potential problems, posed by 
the ADAAA, in protecting women with HIVIAIDS who reproduce. 34 
Finally, Part VII reaffirms the notion that women with HIV I AIDS 
should not be "substantially limited" from making their own 
reproductive choices. 35 
Public health scholars such as Lawrence Gostin and James Hodge 
have articulated the need for feminist legal theory to address the 
reality many women living with HIV I AIDS face: 
Feminist theories, despite all of their degrees and 
differences, agree that "the evaluation of medical practices 
must give primary attention to the impact of such practices 
on women-not just on individual women but on women as 
a group, including especially disadvantaged women such as 
29. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. 
30. See infra Part II. 
31. See infra Part III. 
32. See infra Part IV. 
33. See infra Part V. 
34. See infra Part VI. 
35. See infra Part VII. 
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poor women and women of color." ... [W]omen have been 
viewed as "vectors" of disease who infect unsuspecting men 
or children. The rise of heterosexual and vertical 
transmission of HIV was attributed in part to women. And 
like other high-risk groups, HIV -positive women became 
silent victims of the disease .... 36 
This Article expounds upon this assertion by addressing how women 
with HIV I AIDS are marginalized. It seeks to remedy this 
marginalization by proposing legal and jurisprudential changes that 
support the notion that all women have the right to choose whether or 
not to reproduce. 
II. COURTS' INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 
BRAGDON'S REPRODUCTION STANDARD 
By stating that having HIVIAIDS substantially limits a woman's 
ability to reproduce, the Bragdon Court created a standard that 
undercut its own goal-it invoked the ADA to protect a woman 
living with HIV from being discriminated against in a medical 
setting, but it simultaneously established a framework under which 
medical professionals could discriminate against women with 
HIV I AIDS in the context of reproduction. 37 When authoring the 
Bragdon opinion, Justice Kennedy went out of his way to mention 
that Bragdon could have been decided on grounds other than 
reproduction, and that if another plaintiff had brought the case, he or 
she could have argued that HIV I AIDS substantially limited a 
different major life activity.38 His view was correct; reliance on the 
Bragdon reproduction standard does not sufficiently protect everyone 
living with HIVIAIDS. Despite Justice Kennedy's intentions, 
however, lower courts have largely adhered to the reproduction 
standard when determining whether HIV I AIDS is a disability under 
the ADA.39 
United States v. Happy Time Day Care Center,40 a district court 
case decided while Bragdon was in flux,41 demonstrated the difficulty 
36. Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIVIAJDS 
and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in 
Partner Notification, 5 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 9, 70-71 (quoting Karen Lebacqz, 
Feminism and Bioethics: An Overview, SECOND OPINION, Oct. 1991, at II, 12). 
37. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,641,655 (1998). 
38. Jd. at 637-38. 
39. See, e.g., Cruz Carillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144 (D. P.R. 2001). 
40. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (W.O. Wis. 1998). 
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of using the reproduction standard for HIV/AIDS-related ADA 
cases.42 In Happy Time Day Care, a case alleging discrimination 
against a five-year-old boy living with HIV, the court held that using 
the reproduction standard then-posed by Bragdon43 would be 
problematic.44 It determined that "[t]he correct and more logical 
application is to start by identifying those activities that are important 
in the life of [the boy]. Procreation does not make this list.'"'5 Basing 
its analysis on major life activities important to a small child, the 
court ultimately determined that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether the boy was disabled under the ADA because 
his HIV substantially limited his ability to care for himself. 46 
Consequently, it denied the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment.47 While the Happy Time Day Care court rationally related 
the facts of the matter to the goals of the ADA, the court may have 
decided differently if the case had occurred a few months later. After 
Bragdon, the court might have felt compelled to apply the 
reproduction standard to this situation, and, consequently, it might 
have found that the boy was not protected under the ADA. 
Shortly after Bragdon was decided, one commentator recognized 
how the case could produce problematic results in lower courts: 
"[B]y basing its decision on the 'major life activity' of reproduction, 
the Court creates a new category of individuals whom it will consider 
disabled-a category that does not adequately protect those with 
HIV .... "48 This commentator's observation portends the 
inconsistent and sometimes peculiar applications of the reproduction 
standard established in Bragdon. 
Some lower courts applied the reproduction standard broadly, 
expanding the boundaries of the ADA beyond HIV/AIDS, to protect 
anyone who encountered problems reproducing.49 In HIV/AIDS-
41. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Bragdon on March 30, 1998, and 
decided it on June 25, 1998. Happy Time Day Care was decided on April 13, 1998. 
42. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1078-80. 
43. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (I st Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
44. Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1078-80. 
45. !d. at 1080. 
46. !d. at I 081. 
47. /d. at 1084. 
48. Christiana M. Ajalat, Note, Is HIV Really a "Disability"?: The Scope of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act after Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 22 
HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 751, 760 (1999). 
49. See, e.g., LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. Mich. 2001) 
(holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a female 
employee's infertility was a disability under the ADA and whether the woman's 
396 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
related cases, some courts found that Abbott's choice not to procreate 
was the deciding factor in determining whether her HIV substantially 
limited her major life activity of reproduction. 50 Therefore, courts did 
not always find that people with HIV I AIDS were protected against 
discrimination under the ADA. 51 For instance, in Blanks v. Southwest 
Bell Communications, Inc.,52 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court decision that a male plaintiff 
living with HIV was not considered disabled under the ADA because 
he and his wife had previously decided not to have children, and his 
wife had undergone a procedure to prevent her from becoming 
pregnant.53 Similarly, in Gutwaks v. American Airlines, Inc., 54 a 
district court ruled that a homosexual man living with HIV was not 
disabled because, since he had no intention of having children, his 
HIV did not limit a major life activity. 55 In both Blanks and Gutwaks, 
if the plaintiffs had merely expressed a desire to have children before 
being diagnosed with HIV, they would have been deemed disabled 
under the ADA. 56 However, because these plaintiffs did not choose, 
or at least express a desire, to reproduce, they somehow became less 
worthy of protection and more vulnerable to discrimination. 
Other courts have applied the reproduction standard differently. In 
Teachout v. New York City Department of Education,57 a district 
court held that a plaintiffs HIV infection was a disability under the 
employer was obligated to provide reasonable accommodations for her to receive 
infertility treatment). 
50. E.g., Worster v. Carlson Wagon Lit Travel, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 257, 265-66 (D. 
Conn. 2005). 
51. Gutwaks v. Am. Airline, Inc., No. 3:98-CV-2120-BF, 1999 WL 1611328, at *4 (N.D. 
Tex. Sept. 2, 1999); Cruz Carillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144-46 
(D. P.R. 2001); Blanks v. Sw. Bell Cornmc'ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
52. 310 F.3d 398. 
53. /d. at 401. The court stated that in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 
(1999), the Court considered the "hemic and lymphatic" systems "major life 
activities." Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401. However, the Sutton Court actually stated that 
"[u]nder the regulations, a 'physical impairment' includes ' ... anatomical loss 
affecting one or more of the following body systems: ... hemic and lymphatic."' 527 
U.S. at 479-480 (emphasis added). If the court had actually determined that the 
proper functioning of the hemic and lymphatic systems were major life activities, it 
may have found that the plaintiffs HIV substantially limited these systems and 
therefore limited a major life activity. 
54. 1999 WL 1611328. 
55. /d. at *4. 
56. See Blanks, 310 F.3d at401; Gutwaks, !999 WL 1611328 at *4-5. 
57. No. 04 Civ. 945, 2006 WL 452022 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006). 
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ADA because it substantially limited his ability to reproduce. 58 The 
plaintiff in Teachout did not even mention the issue of reproduction 
during his deposition.59 Nevertheless, the court applied the 
reproduction standard to his situation, stating that "the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged the abundance of medical evidence showing 
that the HIV infection substantially limits the ability to reproduce as a 
general matter, and [plaintiff] is not required to reinvent that wheel in 
response to [defendant's] motion for summary judgment."60 
Although the court acknowledged that the Bragdon Court had 
declined to consider whether HIV was a disability per se, it 
ultimately decided that the Bragdon Court made it clear that the 
plaintiff should be protected under the ADA because his HIV 
affected his physical ability to reproduce. 61 
The Teachout court dispelled the notion that personal choice was 
the determining factor, stating that "[i]t is not necessary for a plaintiff 
to want to have children, or for a plaintiff to plan to have children, to 
show that his ability to have children has been substantially limited 
by infection with HIV."62 However, the court subsequently 
distinguished personal choice from physical ability: 
If, however, a plaintiff were to claim that his HIV infection 
substantially limited his ability to reproduce, but the 
evidence in the record showed that he was physically 
incapable of reproduction for reasons unrelated to his HIV-
positive status, such as a voluntary irreversible sterilization, 
then in that case, the plaintiff would not have a disability 
under the ADA. 63 
While the court departed from the Blanks personal choice standard, 
its interpretation of Bragdon was nevertheless problematic because it 
excluded some people living with HIV/AIDS solely because they had 
been physically unable to reproduce before having HIV.64 
58. /d. at *8. 
59. /d. at *7. 
60. /d. 
61. See id. at *7-8. The court also stated that plaintiff's "failure to mention reproduction 
at his deposition is not evidence that he carries some previously unknown strain of the 
disease, one that does not affect the ability to reproduce." /d. at *7. 
62. /d. at *7. 
63. /d. 
64. See discussion infra Part IV (explaining the problematic nature of the Bragdon 
standard). 
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The aforementioned cases address discrimination allegations in 
employment settings and some places of public accommodation,65 but 
courts have also applied the Bragdon standard in cases involving 
HIV I AIDS-based discrimination in other places of public 
accommodation, such as doctors' offices and hospitals. 66 Most 
notably, the Bragdon standard was applied in Lesley v. Hee Man 
Chie,67 where a woman living with HIV brought a discrimination 
claim against her obstetrician for transferring her to a different 
hospital for prenatal care, labor, and delivery.68 Here, the First 
Circuit69 did not grapple with whether the plaintiff was disabled, 
because the parties did not dispute this issue. 70 In fact, the court cited 
Bragdon to conclude that "Lesley's HIV -positive status is a disability 
for purposes of the [Rehabilitation] Act."71 The Lesley court's 
reliance on Bragdon presented a peculiar dichotomy. It maintained 
65. The setting in Happy Time Day Care is considered a public accommodation. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(K) (2006) (defining day cares as public accommodations). Also, 
most employers are covered entities under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) 
(2006). While this Article primarily discusses HIV/AIDS-related ADA discrimination 
in medical settings, the discussed cases are relevant because this Article focuses on 
the definition of disability under the ADA, which is the same in both employment 
settings and other places of public accommodation. 
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (providing that public accommodations include a 
"professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service 
establishment"). 
67. 250 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2001). 
68. The plaintiff sued under the 1990 ADA, section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, 
and the Massachusetts Public Accommodations Statute, but she ultimately stipulated 
to dismissal of the ADA claim. !d. at 51. This case was decided under the 
Rehabilitation Act because the hospital was a place that received federal funding. 
Disability Rights Section, U.S. Department of Justice, A Guide to Disability Rights 
Laws (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm. The court therefore 
examined the definition of disability under the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 701, et 
seq. (1973). The Lesley court's use of the Rehabilitation Act as the ground upon 
which to bring a disability claim does not diffuse the applicability of this case when 
examining the ADA's definition of disability. Indeed, "[t]he ADA's definition of 
disability is drawn almost verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped individual' 
included in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 .... Congress' repetition of a well-
established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be 
construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations." Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). See also id. at 645 (stating that "repetition of the 
same language [from the Rehabilitation Act] in a new statute [the 1990 ADA] 
indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial 
interpretations as well."). 
69. This court also decided Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. 
granted, 524 U.S. 624. 
70. Lesley, 250 F.3d at 53. 
71. !d. (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631). 
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that the plaintiffs HIV substantially limited her ability to 
reproduce.72 However, the plaintiffs complaint centered on her 
obstetrician's refusal to treat her like every other pregnant patient, 
implying that her HIV status should not have affected her ability to 
reproduce.73 Put another way, the plaintiff defined herself as 
substantially limited in reproducing, yet she wanted her obstetrician 
not to view her as such when she was pregnant. 74 Thus, Lesley 
epitomizes the incongruity of the reproduction standard, specifically 
in situations when a woman with HIV I AIDS is attempting to 
reproduce. 75 
One commentator expounds upon this paradox when discussing 
potential legal issues surrounding assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs) for women with HIV/AIDS or other physical impairments 
that hinder reproduction: 76 
Under a narrow reading of Bragdon, a court might find that 
a medical condition "substantially limits" reproduction for a 
particular individual only if the condition's reproductive 
risks lead that person to refrain from having children. If 
proof of the specific plaintiffs unwillingness to reproduce is 
necessary to establish a reproductive disability under 
Bragdon, persons seeking to have children through ARTs 
72. See id. at 58. 
73. See id. at 53. 
74. The court ultimately decided that the doctor had not discriminated against the patient 
because he transferred the patient to a hospital that was better versed in HIV -related 
prenatal care in 1994, when the plaintiff was pregnant. See id. at 56. It distinguished 
the case from Bragdon because the doctor did not try to argue that the patient's HIV 
posed a direct threat to him or to others. See id. at 57. Rather, the court decided the 
doctor's decision to transfer the patient was in the best interest of the patient, and no 
discriminatory pretext existed in the case. See id. at 57-58. 
75. See Ajalat, supra note 48, at 764-65 (stating that under the Bragdon standard, an 
HIV -infected mother has a decisional disability and not a physical disability). 
76. The term "assisted reproductive technologies" is also referred to as ARTs. Assisted 
Reproductive Technology: Home, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/ART/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); see also Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving 
Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L. 
REv. 17, 19 (2002). The most common methods of ARTs have included assisted 
insemination, assisted ovulation, and in vitro fertilization. Id. at 22-23 (citing N.Y. 
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 43-60 (1998)). 
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could not claim they are disabled because they have medical 
conditions associated with reproductive risks. 77 
This scenario is quite circular. If a woman with HIV/AIDS would 
like to reproduce, and a medical provider refuses to assist her, she 
may have no recourse because she is specifically claiming that her 
HIV status does not substantially limit her ability to reproduce. 78 
Since her argument would not fall under the Bragdon reproduction 
framework, a court might not find that she has a disability, and she 
might not be protected under the ADA. This situation is clearly a 
problematic one, one that undermines the precise purpose of the 
ADA. 
III. THE REPRODUCTION STANDARD FROM A 1998 PUBLIC 
HEALTH STANDPOINT 
The Bragdon Court stated that "an HIV -infected woman's ability to 
reproduce is substantially limited in two independent ways: If she 
tries to conceive a child, (1) she imposes on her male partner a 
statistically significant risk of becoming infected; and (2) she risks 
infecting her child during gestation and childbirth, i.e., perinatal 
transmission."79 Reliance on these risks as the sole reasons why a 
person with HIV/AIDS is disabled under the ADA is both misleading 
and stigmatizing. 80 The Bragdon Court emphasized the importance 
of looking to public health authorities to determine whether 
Bragdon's refusal to treat Abbott in his dentist office was a 
reasonable choice. 81 To follow the Bragdon Court's rationale, this 
Article will examine HIV I AIDS and reproduction in the context of 
public health. 
A. Partner Transmission Data: 1998 
When discussing the risk of female-to-male partner transmission, 
the Bragdon Court cited "[ c ]umulative results of 13 studies collected 
in a 1994 textbook on AIDS" to conclude "that 20% of male partners 
of women with HIV became HIV -positive themselves."82 The Court 
77. Coleman, supra note 76, at 35. 
78. !d. 
79. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 625 (1998). 
80. See discussion infra Part IV. 
81. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 650 ("In assessing the reasonableness of petitioner's actions, the 
views of public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and 
the National Institutes of Health, are of special weight and authority." (citing Sch. Bd. 
of Nassau City v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987))). 
82. /d. at 639. 
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emphasized the transmission risk women posed to men, when in 
reality, according to public health data published in 1998, the very 
year Bragdon was decided, "[t]he rate of transmission of HN from 
male to female [was] two to three [times] higher than that from 
female to male."83 Both biological84 and socio-cultural gender 
differences contributed-and still contribute-to this reality. 85 In the 
United States: 
From a biological perspective, women have an elevated 
risk . . . of contracting disease within the context of a 
heterosexual relationship .... This increased biological risk 
also can be seen epidemiologically. Women currently 
comprise one of the fastest growing groups of people with 
HIV I AIDS, with increased infection rates seen most heavily 
among minority women. 86 
From a socio-cultural standpoint: 
[W]omen are essentially at more risk because of the 
conditions in cultures and communities that remove their 
control over their own bodies. Women are often blamed 
incorrectly as the source of HIV infection .... Conversely, 
many more women are monogamous, but are at high risk 
due to the sexual behavior of their male partner. 87 
Even based on 1994 public health data, it is not at all clear that the 
Bragdon Court's assumption that the risk of female-to-male 
transmission during heterosexual intercourse substantially limits a 
person's ability to reproduce. 88 Well before 1998, ARTs were 
83. JAMES MCINTYRE, HIV IN PREGNANCY: A REVIEW 6, available at http://data.unaids. 
org/Publications/IRC-pubOl/jc 151-hiv-in-pregnancy _ en.pdf (written in conjunction 
with a working group on HIV and pregnancy, composed ofstaffofthe World Health 
Organization's Reproductive Health Programme and the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)). While this review provides an analysis of 
women and HIV I AIDS in an international context, it demonstrates the reality in the 
United States as well. 
84. Biologically, in women, the "Langerhans' cells of the cervix may provide a portal of 
entry for HIV and it has been suggested that some HIV serotypes may have higher 
affinity for these, and therefore to be more efficient in heterosexual transmission." /d. 
85. Jd. 
86. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 68 (footnotes omitted). 
87. MciNTYRE, supra note 83, at 7. 
88. For a discussion of the Court's rationale, see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-
40 (1998). 
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considered viable options for women to reproduce without engaging 
in sexual intercourse. 89 Consequently, a person with HIVIAIDS 
could reproduce without posing any transmission risk to his or her 
sexual partner.90 Since ARTs were a proven method of alternative 
reproduction prior to 1998, the Court's statement that "a woman 
infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on the man a 
significant risk of becoming infected"91 does not necessarily hold 
true. By focusing on this risky scenario alone, the Court opens up the 
possibility for lower courts to perpetuate the idea that a woman with 
HIV I AIDS is always placing her partner at risk by attempting to 
reproduce. 
B. Perinatal Transmission Data: 1998 
The Bragdon Court's focus on the risks of perinatal transmission 
once again suggests a viewpoint that women with HIVIAIDS should 
not reproduce. 92 Citing public health data from 1992 and 1994, the 
Court stated that the risk of perinatal transmission was approximately 
25%.93 While the Court acknowledged that AR V therapy lowered the 
risk to about 8%,94 it did not discuss whether the 25% figure or the 
8% figure was the relevant statistic. Rather, according to the Court, 
"[i]t cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting 
a dread and fatal disease to one's child does not represent a 
substantial limitation on reproduction."95 Therefore, the Court 
implied that, even when a woman with HIV I AIDS takes every 
possible precaution, having HIV I AIDS would still substantially limit 
her ability to reproduce. 
A 1998 report of public health data confirmed that, if a woman 
living with HIV I AIDS took no medicine or preventive measures, the 
probability that she would have transmitted HIV to her child was 
indeed approximately 25%.96 However, in the early to mid-1990s, 
89. See Assisted Reproductive Technology: Home, Ctrs. for Disease Control and 
Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
90. See CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POL'Y, HIV AND PREGNANCY: A GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND 
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR WOMEN AND THEIR ADVOCATES 16-17 (2009), available 
at http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/view/474 (addressing ways in which 
serodiscordant couples can conceive without transmission). 
91. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. 
92. See id. at 640-41. 
93. !d. at 640. 
94. Id. Petitioner, Bragdon mentions the 8% perinatal transmission rate when 
antiretroviral therapy is used. Id. 
95. !d. at 641. 
96. MciNTYRE, supra note 83, at 9-10. 
2010] "Substantially Limited:" Women Living With HIV/AIDS 403 
ARV therapy was beginning to decrease this risk significantly. 97 
During this time, public health authorities also began pinpointing 
factors that contributed to perinatal transmission98 and steps a woman 
could take before, during, and after pregnancy to prevent it.99 
C. Bragdon and Public Health 
By conclusively deciding that having HIVIAIDS substantially 
limited a woman's ability to reproduce, regardless of preventive 
measures, the Bragdon Court sidestepped the public health reality 
present in 1998.100 It did not mention the importance ofprenatal care 
and prevention, and it consequently set a precedent in the United 
States that the risks of reproducing would largely outweigh the 
benefits. By focusing on the substantial limitation HIVIAIDS placed 
on reproduction, 101 the Bragdon Court made a seemingly absolute 
statement, and lower courts have yet to reconcile it with medical 
advancements surrounding HIV I AIDS and reproduction. 
Moreover, the Court's implicit suggestion that women with 
HIV I AIDS should not reproduce has contributed to an atmosphere in 
which women who would like to reproduce have been dissuaded 
from following the proper care protocol, due to fear of stigma or 
judgment. 102 This discouragement undercuts the advice of public 
health authorities in the 1990s.103 For example, in 1995, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended that "HIV-
infected women should receive information about all reproductive 
options. Reproductive counseling should be nondirective. Health-
97. "The estimated annual incidence of perinatal infections declined by 27% in the United 
States between 1992 and 1995 after the widespread implementation of antiretroviral 
therapy in pregnancy." Id. at 10 (citation omitted). 
98. See id. at 10-15. 
99. In fact, in 1998, public health authorities had already suspected that "successful use of 
antiretroviral therapy ... has [led] to suggestions that it may eventually be possible to 
reduce perinatal transmission rates to less than 2%." Jd. at 15-16 (citing Bryson Y. 
Perinatal HIV -1 Transmission: Recent Advances and Therapeutic Interventions. 
AIDS, 1996, 10 ((Supp. 3):S33-S42)). In addition to a consistent routine of ARV 
therapy, other preventive measures identified in 1998 included a woman delivering 
through a caesarean-section procedure and avoiding breast feeding. Jd. at 16. 
100. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660-63 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (emphasizing that the majority opinion was contrary to the sound studies of 
public health authorities). 
101. Id. at 641. 
102. See infra Part IV. 
103. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 662-{)4 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
404 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
care providers should be aware of the complex issues that HIV-
infected women must consider when making decisions about their 
reproductive options and should be supportive of any decision." 104 
Meanwhile, the Bragdon Court believed that "[ c ]onception and child 
birth are not impossible for an HIV victim but, without doubt, are 
dangerous to the public health."105 While it left open the possibility 
that women living with HIVIAIDS could safely reproduce, its 
conclusion implied that a woman with HIV who chooses to reproduce 
is making a detrimental decision, regardless of personal 
circumstances. 106 
IV. RELIANCE ON THE BRAGDON STANDARD REMAINS 
PROBLEMATIC TODAY 
The Bragdon Court's obvious disapproval of the choice to 
reproduce was perhaps more understandable given the public 
perception of HIVIAIDS in 1998. However, while treatments to 
prevent HIVIAIDS transmission have improved, the Bragdon Court's 
framework remains static. For well over the past decade, 
advancements in HIV I AIDS treatment have reduced the risk of 
partner and perinatal transmission. 107 Specifically, as predicted in the 
late-1990s, the use of ARVs, combined with caesarian-section 
delivery, has decreased the risk of perinatal transmission to below 
2%. 108 In addition, HIV I AIDS is no longer considered an absolute 
death sentence. 109 The use of ARVs has proven to extend the lives of 
those living with HIV, in this case enabling mothers to live longer 
lives and to care for their children. 110 
The legal world's lack of progress regarding its view ofHIVIAIDS 
and reproduction is problematic because it fails to incorporate the 
104. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Public Health Service Recommendations 
for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Counseling and Voluntary Testing for Pregnant 
Women, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 7, 1995, at 10, available at 
www.cdc.gov/mmWR/PDF/rr/rr4407.pdf. 
105. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. 
106. See id. (noting that "[t)he decision to reproduce carries economic and legal 
consequences"). 
107. CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4 (discussing the substantial decline in 
perinatal HIV transmission between 1994 and 2005 as a result of ARVs). 
108. !d. (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health: 
Reduction in Perinatal Transmission of HJV Infection-United States, 1985-2005, 55 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP 592 (2006)). Absent any intervention, the risk 
of perinatal transmission remains at 25%. !d. 
109. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st 
Century, 13 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 241, 319 (2008). 
110. CTR. FOR HlV LAW & POL'Y, supra note 90, at 4. 
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scientific evidence behind HN I AIDS transmission, 111 and it does not 
combat discrimination against women with HN I AIDS. 112 As 
expressed in this Article, women living with HN I AIDS have not 
only been discouraged from reproducing, 113 but they also have 
struggled to access comprehensive medical treatment when 
pregnant. 114 This lack of medical care severely increases the chances 
that a child will be born with HIV. 115 
If a woman with HN I AIDS wants to reproduce and a doctor 
refuses to treat her properly, it would be difficult for the woman, in 
light of the Bragdon reproduction standard, to feel as though she has 
an ally in the legal world. While the Bragdon Court stated that a 
woman with HN I AIDS who reproduces creates a danger to the 
public health, 116 the public health is compromised even more if the 
woman does not receive the proper medical treatment because she is 
frightened to disclose her HN status to her doctor. 117 For example, 
the woman might decide not to mention her HN status to her 
obstetrician and consequently not receive the appropriate prenatal 
care. Unfortunately, this scenario is steeped in reality. According to 
a Community Liaison at Children's National Medical Center, in 
Washington, D.C., if HIVIAIDS doctors discourage women from 
reproducing, some women will stop receiving HIVIAIDS treatment 
and will seek prenatal care without ever mentioning their HIV status 
to their obstetricians. 118 
Ill. See infra Part V. 
112. See Stop Violence Against Women: HIVIAIDS, Women, and Human Rights, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/womenlhivaids.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) 
(explaining that women infected with HIV are often "socially ostracized" and that 
"[d]iscrimination is integrally linked to women's experiences with HIV/AIDS"). 
113. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (cautioning that conception for an 
HIV victim is "dangerous to the public health"). 
114. See HIV & AIDS Stigma and Discrimination, http://www.avert.org/aidsstigrna.htm 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010). "In healthcare settings people with HIV can experience 
stigma and discrimination such as being refused medicines or access to facilities .... " 
/d. 
115. CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4. If perinatal transmission is "sharply 
reduced" by prenatal care, then conversely, with no medical intervention, perinatal 
transmission is more likely. See id. 
116. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. 
117. See CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4; Gregory M. Herek et al., HIV-
Related Stigma and Knowledge in the United States: Prevalence and Trends, 1991-
1999, A..'\1. J. PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 2002, at 371, 376. 
118. Telephone Interview with Ebony Johnson, Cmty. Liaison, Family Connections, 
Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., D.C. (Nov. 20, 2009). 
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Situations such as this one have occurred and continue to occur 
because of the stigma surrounding women living with HIV I AIDS 
who would like to procreate. 119 The legal world has done little to 
combat this stigma, both when Bragdon was decided, as well as 
today. 120 By evading this reality, courts have established a 
framework that is more damaging to the public health than it would 
have been if the issue had been comprehensively addressed. 
V. TRANSLATING REALITY INTO LAW 
A. Women with HIV/AIDS and the Choice to Reproduce 
A legal structure that fully protects women with HIVIAIDS must 
recognize that the choice to reproduce is a complicated one, but that 
many women will either choose to reproduce or will have the choice 
forced upon them. 121 Some women with HIV I AIDS want to 
reproduce, seeing the decision to have children as central to their 
womanhood.122 At times, however, cultural and economic factors do 
not always place women in full control of this decision. 123 
Stigmatizing women with HIV I AIDS who give birth serves only to 
marginalize them and further endanger the public health. 
According to a 2009 study, 59% of women living with HIV124 
wanted to have a child, and the main reason for this desire was "'to 
experience motherhood. "'125 Likewise, in other studies, women 
living with HIVIAIDS have cited both social and personal reasons for 
wanting to procreate. 126 Culturally, 
most Western societies encourage reproduction and 
emphasize motherhood as a valued role for women .... 
Pregnancy elevates a woman's status in some communities 
and is often an opportunity for women to feel good about 
themselves. Babies represent love, acceptance, and a legacy 
119. See Herek eta!., supra note 117, at 371. 
120. See id 
121. See Karolynn Siegel & Eric W. Schrimshaw, Reasons and Justifications for 
Considering Pregnancy Among Women Living with HJVIAJDS, 25 PSYCHOL. WOMEN 
Q. 112, 115-16 (2001). 
122. Jd at 117. 
123. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 68-69. 
124. The women in the study were all of reproductive age (ages fifteen to forty-four). 
Sarah Finocchario-Kessler et a!., Understanding High Fertility Desires and Intentions 
Among a Sample of Urban Women Living with HIV in the United States, AIDS 
BEHA v., Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19908135. 
125. Jd Contrarily, having HIV was cited as the main reason not to have a child. ld 
126. Siegel & Schrimshaw, supra note 121, at 116. 
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for the future, even for a woman without a sense of future 
for herself. 127 
Put simply, for many women, motherhood epitomizes femininity. 128 
Therefore, many women, with or without HIV I AIDS, choose the path 
of reproduction at some point in their lives. 
However, the decision to reproduce is not always that of the 
woman, and access to timely and appropriate medical care is not a 
given. 129 At times, a woman may have no true choice regarding 
whether or not she becomes pregnant or carries her child to term. 
Public health experts recognize that "[m]any women ... lack control 
over their own exposure [to HIV and other sexually transmitted 
infections] because of their inability to make critical life choices due 
to poverty, domestic violence, and discrimination."130 Likewise, 
some women "lack the power in their relationships to require male 
partners to refrain from sex or to use condoms."131 This lack of 
power and control can lead not only to sexually transmitted infections 
but also to unintended pregnancy. Regardless of the situation, ample 
evidence indicates that women with HIV I AIDS will continue to 
become pregnant, whether planned or unplanned. 132 Given this 
reality, the question of how medical and legal settings should adjust 
remains to be answered. 
B. Social Determinants of Health: The Physician-Patient Power 
Play 
Society views HIV I AIDS as a taboo disease. Because primary 
transmission methods include sexual intercourse and injection drug 
use, some people feel that HIV I AIDS is caused by scandalous and 
blame-worthy behavior. 133 The disease remains in the shadows of 
127. Deborah Ingram & Sally A. Hutchinson, Double Binds and the Reproductive and 
Mothering Experiences of HIV-Positive Women, 10 QUAL. HEALTH REs. 117, 118 
(2000). 
128. See id. 
129. See infra Part V.B. 
130. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 69; see also Jane Stoever, Stories Absent from the 
Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 
N.Y.L. ScH. CLINICAL REs. INST., Research Paper Series No. 09/10 #2 (discussing the 
correlation between HIV/AIDS and domestic violence). 
131. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 69. 
132. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV/AIDS, Pregnancy & Childbirth, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/perinatal/index.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 201 0). 
133. See generally Herek et al., supra note 117, at 371 (discussing negative feelings toward 
people with AIDS (PWAs), such as the "belief that they deserve their illness"); 
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society, distinguished from other serious diseases, such as cancer, 
diabetes, and heart disease. 134 Moreover, HIV/AIDS has been 
particularly prevalent in minority populations, including homosexual 
men, injection drug users, and women of color. 135 This 
marginalization of people with HIV I AIDS seeps into the medical 
world, often affecting medical services. 136 For women, especially 
women of color, social determinants of health play a large role in 
both access to and choice of health care. 137 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO): 
The social determinants of health are the conditions in 
which people are born, grow, live, work and age, including 
the health system. These circumstances are shaped by the 
distribution of money, power and resources at global, 
national and local levels ... [and] are mostly responsible for 
health inequities-the unfair and avoidable differences m 
health status seen within and between countries. 138 
Social determinants of health are evident in the United States, where, 
according to a state-by-state study, 
[ w ]omen of color fared worse than White women across a 
broad range of measures . . . and in some states these 
disparities were quite stark. Some of the largest disparities 
were in the rates of new AIDS cases, late or no prenatal 
Motoko Y. Lee et al., Victim-Blaming Tendency Toward People with AIDS Among 
College Students, J. Soc. PSYCHOL., June 1999, at 300 (citing surveys in which people 
blamed the victims of AIDS for contracting the virus through behavior). 
134. See Herek et al., supra note 117, at 371. 
135. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Cases of HIV Infection and AIDS in the U.S. 
and Dependent Areas, 2007, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., 2009, at 14, 26, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/basic.htrn (last visited Apr. II, 20 I 0). 
136. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Texas Orthopaedic Surgeon 
to Provide Individuals Living with HIV/AIDS Equal Access to Services (Oct. 16, 
2009), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/l 0/200910 16a.html (last visited Apr. 
11, 2010). 
137. "Health disparities in HIV/AIDS, viral hepatitis, STDs and TB are inextricably linked 
to a complex blend of social and economic determinants that influence which 
populations are most severely affected by these diseases." Memorandum from U.S. 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Prevention Projects for Cmty.-Based Orgs. 9-10, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/funding/PS I 0-1 003/pdf/PS 10-1003 _FOA.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
138. World Health Org., Social Determinants of Health, http://www.who.int/social_ 
determinants/en/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
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care, no insurance coverage, and lack of a high school 
diploma. 139 
Hence, many women of color find themselves in precarious health 
care situations, sometimes in the crossroads of HIVIAIDS and 
reproduction. While appropriate medical care is the conceivable 
solution, navigating the health care system often proves difficult. 
A power dynamic exists between many patients and their 
physicians; patients often defer to their physicians' opinions 
regarding medical issues because of their physicians' education and 
expertise. 140 This relationship, while usually beneficial, can become 
detrimental in certain circumstances. Social determinants of health 
intensify this physician-patient power play: 
In order to benefit from the medical advances that can 
reduce perinatal transmission and extend health and life, 
women need accurate, complete, and understandable 
information that trustworthy professionals provide honestly 
and respectfully. Women at greatest risk-including poor 
women, substance users, sex workers, and survivors of 
domestic violence-often have, at best, very fragile 
connections to health care. Many have experienced 
disrespectful treatment from doctors, service providers, and 
bureaucrats and rely on their peers for information about 
HIV, other health issues, and medicine. 141 
Women with HIV I AIDS often feel uncomfortable communicating 
their needs to medical providers because of previous experiences 
both inside and outside of doctors' offices. 142 Couple this situation 
with pregnancy, and a woman with HIV I AIDS who is discouraged 
from having a baby is severely disadvantaged in receiving adequate 
care. 
139. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PlJITING WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES ON THE MAP: 
EXAMINING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES AT THE STATE LEVEL 2 (2009), 
http://www.kff.org/rninorityhealth/upload/7886.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 20 I 0). 
140. See Timothy E. Quill & Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and Patient 
Autonomy: Finding a Balance Between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 763, 765-66 (!996). 
141. CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4. 
142. See id. 
410 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
Some women living with HIV I AIDS reported being misinformed 
by their doctors about the risks involved in procreating. 143 For 
example, one woman recalled, 
I only had really one week to decide what to do. I found out 
I was HIV positive when I was 13 weeks pregnant. And in 
1990, of course, they [doctors] said there was a 75% or 80% 
chance oftransmission. That's baloney. 
She went on to say that she decided to have an abortion, a 
decision that she now regrets. 144 
Other women have been in medical settings that have attempted to 
shame them into choosing not to reproduce. 145 According to a study 
concluded in 2000: 
One mother whose baby tested negative spoke angrily about 
the lack of sensitivity demonstrated at a local public health 
office where HIV -positive women sought prenatal care: 
"Don't ever have on your wall the poster with the little baby 
that says she has her daddy's eyes and her mother's AIDS. 
Every time I go into [the local public health unit] and it is 
hanging up, I want to rip it off the wall. Don't you think we 
have enough guilt that they need to walk in and see that?"146 
As comments such as these indicate, the lack of helpful and accurate 
information for women living with HIVIAIDS, combined with the 
stigma surrounding HIV I AIDS and reproduction, creates a 
paradoxical and uncomfortable situation for women living with 
HIVIAIDS. 147 
In addition to stigma, some medical professionals have little 
experience treating HIV I AIDS and therefore are unaware of which 
protocol to follow when addressing HIV I AIDS and reproduction. 148 
143. See Richard L. Sowell & Terry R. Misener, Decisions to Have a Baby by HIV-
lnfected Women, 19 W. J. OF NURSING RES. 56, 63 (1997). 
144. !d. at 62 (alteration in original). 
145. See Ingram & Hutchinson, supra note 127, at 122. 
146. !d. (alteration in original). 
147. See supra notes 143--45 and accompanying text. 
148. The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has provided 
recommendations to obstetricians and gynecologists, but there is no uniform protocol. 
See The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Routine Screening 
Welcome, http://www.acog.org/departments/dept_notice.cfm?recno=39&bulletin= 
4617 (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Routine Screening Welcome]; The 
American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Perinatal Welcome, 
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Since no specific framework is required, an obstetrician could treat a 
pregnant patient without following the medically accepted protocol 
for testing a mother for HIV at various stages in her pregnancy. 149 In 
addition, if a pregnant woman is known to have HIV/AIDS, some 
medical professionals are not equipped with enough information to 
treat her. 150 While the American Congress of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) has recently provided recommendations to 
obstetricians and gynecologists (OB/GYNs) regarding routine HIV 
testing151 and perinatal transmission prevention, 152 no mandatory 
protocol exists. 153 This lack of a standard could prove harmful to a 
patient whose doctor does not follow these recommendations. 
In order to improve reproductive services for women living with 
HIV/AIDS, the ACOG, the American Medical Association (AMA), 
and medical schools should emphasize collaboration between the 
OB/GYN and HIV/AIDS specialties. Specifically, OB/GYNs, while 
now merely encouraged to provide opt-out HIV testing, 154 should be 
required to do so. This testing should be combined with physician-
patient pre- and post-test counseling and a full discussion of what 
testing entails. 155 Likewise, HIV/AIDS specialists should have opt-
out pregnancy counseling for all women of reproductive age. The 
opt-out nature of these practices would prevent women from feeling 
forced to succumb to mandatory protocols, but it would also, over 
time, solidify the idea that testing and counseling are not 
http://www.acog.org/departments/dept_notice.cfm?recno=39&bulletin=3527 (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Perinatal Welcome]. 
149. Telephone Interview with Maryellen Grysewicz, RN, C, ACRN, Children's Hospital 
of Philadelphia and former public health HIV/AIDS nurse (Dec. 8, 2009) (discussing 
how a mother gave birth to a child with HIV because she contracted HIV while 
pregnant and was not tested regularly throughout her pregnancy). 
150. /d. 
151. Routine Screening Welcome, supra note 148. 
152. Perinatal Welcome, supra note 148. 
153. See Routine Screening Welcome, supra note 148; Perinatal Welcome, supra note 148. 
154. Press Release, The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Routine 
HIV Screening Recommended for All Women, Regardless of Individual Risk Factors 
(Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.acog.org/from _ home/publications/press_releases/nr08-0 1-
08-l.cfrn (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Routine HIV Screening 
Recommended for All Women]. 
155. The most sensitive type of HIV test is called the ELISA test. It detects HIV 
antibodies in the blood and is 99.5% sensitive. A positive ELISA test should be 
confirmed by a second test called the Western Blot. In addition, newer rapid testing 
technologies are beginning to emerge. These tests can be done with a saliva sample, 
and preliminary results could form in as little as twenty minutes. See CTR. FOR HIV 
LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 11-12. 
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extraordinary measures that only apply to marginalized 
communities. 156 
The coordination between HIV I AIDS and OBIGYN education 
would also increase awareness that a distinct crossover field exists in 
medicine today. It would decrease the stigma surrounding 
HIV I AIDS and reproduction because it would be treated as a more 
commonplace issue in the medical world. Ultimately, a doctor has a 
duty to treat his or her patient, including a patient with an ADA-
recognized disability, unless the patient presents a direct threat to 
others. 157 While a medical provider certainly should use his or her 
discretion based on medical expertise, purported "discretion" based 
on personal opinions or moral judgments should be viewed as 
discrimination. Professional medical associations and medical 
schools should emphasize this distinction to prevent further 
discrimination against HIV I AIDS and reproduction. 
VI. NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE ADA AMENDMENTS 
ACT OF 2008 
A. Legislative Intent to Include HIV/AIDS 
Congress realized that the Supreme Court was narrowing the ADA 
in a way that undermined its legislative intent, and it therefore 
decided to broaden the Act by passing the ADAAA. 158 Similar to the 
provisions of the ADA, to have a disability under the ADAAA, a 
person must have: (1) an impairment that (2) substantially limits (3) 
one or more major life activities. 159 When discussing the purposes of 
the ADAAA, Congress cited a litany of Supreme Court cases that 
interpreted the ADA much more narrowly than Congress had 
intended. 160 It referred to cases such as Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc. 161 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams, 162 stating that their holdings "have narrowed the broad 
156. See id. at 4-5; Routine HIV Screening Recommended for All Women, supra note 
154. 
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2007); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648-49 (1998) 
(discussing the ADA's "direct threat" provision). 
158. ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified 
as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2009)). 
159. ADAAA § 3(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
160. ADAAA § 2(a)(4)-(7). 
161. 527 u.s. 471 (1999). 
162. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). The Toyota Court narrowed the definition of "substantially 
limited" to mean "prevents or severely restricts." /d. at 198. Toyota was decided by 
the same Supreme Court Justices as Bragdon, implying that when the Bragdon Court 
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scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus 
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended 
to protect."163 However, Congress did not expressly mention 
Bragdon at all. This exclusion by no means indicates that Congress 
meant to exclude HIV I AIDS from being considered a disability under 
the ADA. In fact, as Congresswoman Tammy Baldwin stated: 
Although the ADA clearly intended to protect people living 
with HIV[,] . . . all too often whether or not they could 
proceed with their discrimination claim has turned on the 
court's view of evidence as to their child-bearing ability and 
intentions: highly personal, intimate matters that are 
completely unrelated to the discrimination they 
experienced. 164 
Also, the House Education and Labor Committee stated that the 
ADAAA will likely "affect cases such as US. v. Happy Time Day 
Care Center in which the courts . . . recogniz[ ed], among other 
things, that 'there is something inherently illogical about inquiring 
whether' a five-year-old's ability to procreate is substantially limited 
by his HIV infection."165 Hence, a new disability framework 
emerged. 
B. New Definition of Disability 
Prior to the passage of the ADAAA, a commentator proposed that, 
"[r]ather than having the Court over-extend the ADA in such a 
fashion as to disable it and open it up to many novel claims, it would 
be far better for Congress to pass legislation which clearly prohibits 
discrimination against those with HIV infection."166 The ADAAA 
did just that, introducing promising provisions that, if interpreted 
held that HIV substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to reproduce, it meant that 
HIV "prevents or severely restricts" a person's ability to reproduce. See id; see also 
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 647. Therefore, Toyota's narrowing of the term "substantially 
limited" further emphasized the Bragdon Court's belief that a woman with HIV/AIDS 
should not reproduce. 
163. ADAAA § 2(a)(4). 
164. 154 CONG. REc. H8297 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Baldwin). 
165. H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 13-14 (2008) (Comm. on Educ. & Labor) (citing 
United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (W.D. Wis. 
1998)). 
166. Ajalat, supra note 48, at 768. 
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appropriately by the courts, could protect people living with 
HIVIAIDS without relying on the reproduction standard. 167 
Specifically, the ADAAA's provisions categorize HIVIAIDS as a 
disability, even when asymptomatic, because it is "episodic or in 
remission ... [and] would substantially limit a major life activity 
when active."168 While "reproductive functions" are considered 
"major life activities" under the ADAAA, 169 "major bodily 
function[s] ... of the immune system" are considered "major life 
activities" as well. 170 The very nature of HIV I AIDS involves 
suppressing a person's immune system. 171 Therefore, HIV I AIDS, 
even in the asymptomatic HIV phase, is clearly considered a 
disability under the ADAAA solely because it substantially limits 
functions of the immune system. 172 By laying out these provisions, 
Congress gives courts a less specific, less stigmatizing, and more 
inclusive reason why people with HIV I AIDS should be protected 
under the ADA. 
C. EEOC Regulations: HIVIAIDS Essentially a Disability Per Se 
While the ADAAA makes it relatively clear that HIV I AIDS meets 
the definition of a disability, the question remains whether courts will 
more consistently determine that HIVIAIDS is a disability per se. 
Currently, defining HIV I AIDS as a disability per se would broadly 
protect all people living with HIV I AIDS from discrimination, 
regardless of whether or not they are able-or have chosen-to 
reproduce. 173 As an alternative to statutory or judicial 
167. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (indicating that there is something 
"inherently illogical" about inquiring whether a five-year-old's ability to procreate is 
substantially limited by his HIV infection). 
168. ADAAA § 3(4)(0). 
169. ADAAA § 3(2)(B). "[R]eproductive functions" are considered "major bodily 
functions," which are included in the list of"major life activities" in the ADAAA. /d. 
170. /d. "[F]unctions of the immune system" are considered "major bodily functions," 
which are included in the list of"major life activities" in the ADAAA. Id. 
171. See Dep't of Health and Human Servs.: Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Basic Information: HIV, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm 
#hiv ("HIV finds and destroys a type of white blood cell (T cells or CD4 cells) that 
the immune system must have to fight disease."). 
172. See EMILY A. BENFER, AM. CONSTITUTION Soc'y FOR LAW & POL'Y, THE ADA 
AMENDMENTS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES TO THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 7 (2009), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Benfer%20ADA 
AA_O.pdf. 
173. 154 CONG. REc. H8298 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) 
("Under the ADA Amendments Act, [people who are HIV/AIDS positive] will all be 
assured legal protection [from] discrimination based on their HIV status, irrespective 
of their child-bearing intentions .... "). 
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modifications, 174 regulatory change seems to be the most feasible way 
to accomplish this goal. 175 In the ADAAA, Congress expressly 
granted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
the Attorney General (under the Department of Justice), and the 
Secretary of Transportation legally binding regulatory authority to 
amend their regulations implementing the ADAAA. 176 Accordingly, 
on September 23, 2009, the EEOC issued proposed regulations. 177 In 
these new regulations, the EEOC specifically states that "major life 
activities" include: 
The operation of major bodily functions, including 
functions of the immune system, special sense organs, and 
skin; normal cell growth; and digestive, genitourinary, 
174. Changing the statutory language of the ADA (and now the ADAAA), to include HIV 
as a disability per se would be problematic for both practical and ideological reasons. 
First, making such a blanket statement would hamper legislative and judicial 
efficiency. Considering it takes years to push most bills through Congress, the lag 
between introducing a new ADAAA standard and implementing it would not benefit 
many people living with HIV today. See Burgdorf, supra note 109, at 253, 268 
(discussing gaps in enforcement of the ADA and pending legislation). From a judicial 
angle, it could take years for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a case in which it 
could classify HIV as a disability per se, taking even longer for lower courts to follow 
suit. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 628-29 (indicating an approximate 
four year gap between a dentist's refusal to treat an HIV patient and the Court's ruling 
on how the ADA applied to the situation). Moreover, in light of rapid medical 
advancements surrounding HIV/AIDS treatment, the issue might be moot by the time 
Congress and the courts make changes. See CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 
90, at 9 (discussing "improvements in HIV care"). 
175. See Burgdorf, supra note 109, at 261-62 (referencing epilepsy regulations endorsed 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as illustrative of how a 
regulatory framework better realizes the intentions of Congress than the judicial 
system, which has carved out exceptions to the definition of epilepsy as a per se 
disability). 
176. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 506, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
The Act states that: 
!d. 
"The authority to issue regulations granted to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, and 
the Secretary of Transportation under this Act includes the 
authority to issue regulations implementing the defmitions of 
disability in section 3 (including rules of construction) and the 
definitions in section 4, consistent with the ADA Amendments 
Act of2008." 
177. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431 (Sept. 23, 2009) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (requesting that written comments on these 
regulations be received by Nov. 23, 2009). 
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bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, 
cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, 
musculoskeletal, and reproductive functions. For example, 
kidney disease affects bladder function; cancer affects 
normal cell growth; diabetes affects functions of the 
endocrine system (e.g., production of insulin); epilepsy 
affects neurological functions or functions of the brain; and 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and AIDS affect 
functions of the immune system and reproductive functions. 
Likewise, sickle cell disease affects functions of the hemic 
system, lymphedema affects lymphatic functions, and 
rheumatoid arthritis affects musculoskeletal functions. 178 
While the EEOC is responsible for Title I of the ADA, as 
amended, 179 the Department of Justice has yet to issue new 
regulations to implement the ADAAA under other titles, including 
Title Ill, Public Accommodations. 180 Because discrimination in 
places of public accommodation, including medical settings, is 
178. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,440 (emphasis 
added). 
179. Title I "prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability." 29 C.F.R. 
app. § 1630 (2009). 
180. The Department of Justice is responsible for issuing regulations for Title III, Public 
Accommodations. See Dep't of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual 
Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, http://ada.gov/taman3. 
html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). However, 
[o]n January 21, 2009, the Department of Justice notified the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that the Department 
has withdrawn its draft final rules to amend the Department's 
regulations implementing title II and title III from the OMB 
review process. This action was taken in response to a 
memorandum from the President's Chief of Staff directing the 
Executive Branch agencies to defer publication of any new 
regulations until the rules are reviewed and approved by officials 
appointed by President Obama. No final action will be taken by 
the Department with respect to these rules until the incoming 
officials have had the opportunity to review the rulemaking 
record. Incoming officials will have the full range of rule-making 
options available to them under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Withdrawal of the draft final rules does not affect existing ADA 
regulations. Title II and title III entities must continue to follow 
the Department's existing ADA regulations, including the ADA 
Standards for Accessible Design. 
Dep't of Justice, Proposed ADA Regulations Withdrawn from OMB Review, 
http://www.ada.gov/ADAregswithdraw09.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
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problematic, the Department of Justice's definition of disability 
should be identical to the EEOC's definition, 181 including HIVIAIDS 
in a list of disabilities. Otherwise, courts might continue to interpret 
the definition of disability narrowly, deciding that per se HIV I AIDS 
disability protection should be limited to employment cases and not 
extending this protection to places of public accommodation. 
D. ADAAA Expands "Regarded As'' Standard 
If, for some reason, a person is not considered actually disabled 
under the ADA, the ADAAA proposes another manner in which he 
or she qualifies for ADA protection. 182 The 1990 ADA provided an 
option for courts to decide that a person living with HIV has a 
disability if he or she is "regarded as having ... an impairment [that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities]." 183 The 2008 
ADAAA expands that notion by adding, 
[a ]n individual meets the requirement of "being regarded as 
having such an impairment" if the individual establishes that 
he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under 
this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is 
perceived to limit a major life activity. 184 
Initially, the ADAAA's "regarded as" provision seems to be the 
solution for how people living with HIV I AIDS can be protected from 
discrimination without relying on the reproduction standard. 185 In a 
sense, it could send a message that people living with HIVIAIDS are 
not necessarily physically disabled, but that they should still be 
protected against discrimination from people who view them as less 
capable. 186 As the Happy Time Day Care court stated, "Congress 
181. The EEOC currently defines "[d]isability" as: "(1) A physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) 
A record of such impairment; or (3) Being regarded as having such an impairment." 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2009). 
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(2009). 
183. /d. § 12102(2) (1990) (emphasis added). 
184. /d.§ 12102(3)(A) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990)). 
185. See id. § 12102(l)(C), (3)(A); see also discussion supra Part Ill. 
186. See Mary Johnson, Letter to the Editor, Poverty is Scourge Behind Global AIDS 
Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at AlO (New York Edition), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1998/07 /ll/opinionll-poverty-is-scourge-behind-global-aids-
epidemic-830585.html?scp=5&sq=bragdon%20v.%20abbott&st=cse. The Letter 
states: 
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acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about 
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical 
limitations that flow from actual impairment."187 The "regarded as" 
prong could be beneficial for many discrimination cases, but whether 
it would adequately protect everyone living with HIV I AIDS, namely 
women who want to reproduce, is a question future court cases will 
likely determine. 
Whereas the "regarded as" prong under the 1990 ADA allowed for 
reasonable accommodations to be provided to someone who is 
thought to have a physical or mental disability, the ADAAA makes it 
clear that individuals who are "regarded as" disabled are no longer 
entitled to any reasonable accommodation. 188 Professor Chai 
Feldblum and collaborators at the Georgetown University Law 
!d. 
Those of us who pushed for passage of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act were comforted that the law would cover those 
who were, to quote the law, "regarded as having a disability" and 
facing discrimination as a result. The point wasn't what kind of 
disability they had; it was that they were considered disabled and 
being treated shabbily as a result. 
Then came Bragdon v. Abbott, all the way to the Supreme Court. 
To the nonlawyers among us, it seemed the part of the law that 
applied in this case was that "regarded" bit: Dr. Randon Bragdon, 
a dentist, regarded Sidney Abbott of Bangor, Me., who has H.l.V., 
as disabled; that's why he wouldn't treat her. 
But no; everyone's off discussing whether having reproductive 
problems makes one "disabled." The point shouldn't be what the 
disability is-or even if Ms. Abbott was disabled: the point should 
be that she was regarded as disabled and denied a service as a 
result. How did things move away from this clear point? 
187. United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1083 (quoting 
School Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (discussing the 
intent of the "regarded as" test under the Rehabilitation Act)). 
188. The ADAAA states: 
A covered entity under subchapter I of this chapter, a public 
entity under subchapter II of this chapter, and any person who 
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation under subchapter III of this chapter, need not 
provide a reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modification 
to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual who meets 
the definition of disability in section 12102(1) of this title solely 
under [the "regarded as" prong]. 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6(a)(l), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 
u.s.c. § l220l(h) (2009)). 
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Center Federal Legislation and Administrative Clinic discuss the 
reasoning behind this decision: 
[W]hen one reviews the facts of the cases in which 
reasonable accommodations have been found to be required 
under the ["regarded as"] prong, it seems clear that the 
plaintiffs in those cases should have been covered under the 
first prong of the definition of disability. Hopefully, that 
will be the case now under the [ADAAA] .... 189 
This expectation seems like a plausible outcome, but the concept has 
yet to be tested in the courts. 
While removing the reasonable accommodation requirement to the 
expanded "regarded as" prong is theoretically logical, the omission 
might give courts an opportunity to deny reasonable accommodations 
to some people with perceived impairments who might need them. 
For example, in the HIV/AIDS and reproduction context, a court 
might decide that a pregnant woman with asymptomatic HIV is not 
actually disabled but "regarded as" impaired. It might also find that 
an ART, such as in vitro fertilization, is considered a reasonable 
accommodation to help the woman conceive without placing her 
partner at risk of transmission. It therefore might decide that the 
woman is not entitled to the reasonable accommodation of an ART 
because she is merely "regarded as" impaired. While ARTs are 
medical procedures that should not be considered reasonable 
accommodations, a court attempting to narrow the broadened scope 
of the ADAAA might choose to interpret the statute in such a 
manner. This scenario, while hopefully never a reality, reveals the 
potential problems the "regarded as" standard could present in the 
HIV/AIDS and reproduction context. 
E. Progress, but No Mention ofBragdon 
Congress made it clear that the intention of the ADA and the 
ADAAA was and is to protect people living with HIV/AIDS from 
discrimination. 190 It also revealed the logical dissonance the 
189. Chai Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 237-38 (2007). 
190. See 154 CONG. REc. H8296 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (Background on Legislation); 
see also 154 CoNG. REc. H8297-98 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Baldwin) ("Under the ADA Amendments Act, [people who are HIV/AIDS positive] 
will all be assured legal protection [from] discrimination based on their HIV status, 
irrespective of their child-bearing intentions .... "). 
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reasoning behind Bragdon poses for cases such as Happy Time Day 
Care, where the person being discriminated against was a five-year-
old boy who was nowhere near reproductive age. 191 However, 
although Congress hinted at the problematic reproduction-based 
HIV I AIDS disability standard, it did not explicitly address the 
Bragdon standard's potential for stigma. Therefore, Congress 
implicitly condoned the reproduction standard as one possible 
criterion by which to decide HIVIAIDS cases. 192 In doing so, 
Congress did not attempt to counteract the stigmatizing nature of 
Bragdon. 
While time will tell whether or not Congress needed to be more 
explicit to refocus HIVIAIDS-related ADA jurisprudence, an 
unambiguous reference to Bragdon could have sent a message that 
went beyond the simple irrationality of the reproduction standard and 
directly attacked the discriminatory view of HIV I AIDS and 
reproduction. Although the ADAAA is a progressive step that 
presents a potential solution, Congress could have quashed some 
stereotypes by simply mentioning that the Bragdon standard is 
narrow and outdated. Instead, Bragdon's legal authority lingers, and 
the stigma surrounding women with HIVIAIDS and reproduction 
remams. 
VII. CONCLUSION: WHERE THE LAW SHOULD MEET 
REALITY 
Women with HIVIAIDS often live difficult and marginalized lives, 
despite many medical advances. The law could, and should, serve as 
a powerful tool to protect their rights and to fight damaging 
stereotypes. Unfortunately, while medical and public health 
authorities have modified their recommendations surrounding 
HIV I AIDS and reproduction to reflect advances in treatment and 
understanding, the legal world has been slow to follow suit. As 
discussed, post-Bragdon case law has relied on the Bragdon Court's 
rationale that having HIVIAIDS substantially limits a woman's 
ability to reproduce. 193 Lower courts' reliance on the reproduction 
standard not only has resulted in inconsistent results for HIVIAIDS-
based ADA cases, but it also has perpetuated the belief that women 
with HIV I AIDS should not reproduce. 194 
191. See Bmgdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 624-26 (1998); Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. 
Supp. 2dat 1074-75. 
192. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69. 
193. See supra Part II. 
194. See supra Parts II, IV-V. 
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When passing the ADAAA, Congress attempted to rectify courts' 
narrow applications of the ADA. Congress unequivocally intended to 
make the ADAAA as broad as possible, expanding provisions under 
which HIVIAIDS could be considered a disability, unrelated to 
reproduction. 195 Also, by granting regulatory authority to the EEOC, 
the Attorney General, and the Department of Transportation, 
Congress enabled regulatory bodies to create binding provisions that 
include HIVIAIDS in a list of diseases considered disabilities per 
se. 196 In addition, by expanding the "regarded as" prong, Congress 
provided another mechanism by which people with HIV I AIDS could 
argue that they are protected under the ADA. 197 
Despite this progress, however, Congress neglected to mention 
Bragdon explicitly. 198 Therefore, it did not do all it could have done 
to overcome the stereotypes surrounding HIV I AIDS and 
reproduction. Under the new provisions of the ADAAA, a woman 
with HIVIAIDS may have more effective recourse against 
reproduction-related discrimination because the standard under which 
she is "disabled" no longer undercuts the services she wants to 
receive. 199 However, by not mentioning the Bragdon reproduction 
standard's potential for stigma, Congress did not address the 
stereotype that HIVIAIDS substantially limits a woman's ability to 
reproduce. While this notion is sometimes true, it is not a full 
reflection of reality. By failing to confront the Bragdon standard 
directly, Congress left open the possibility that courts will not revisit 
the reproduction standard. 
While the general perception of HIV I AIDS has improved, women 
still encounter discrimination in medical and social settings. 200 The 
195. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3(2)(B), 3(4){0), 122 Stat. 
3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009)); see supra Part VI.B. 
(discussing Congress's intent to include HIV/AIDS within the definition of disability 
beyond the reproduction standard). 
196. ADAAA § 506 (Rule of Construction Regarding Regulatory Authority); see supra 
Part VI. C. 
197. See supra Part Vl.D.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(3)(1)(C), 12102(4)(A) (2008) ("[A]n 
individual meets the requirement of 'being regarded as having such an impairment' if 
the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited 
under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment 
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity."). 
198. Seegenera/ly42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. 
199. See id. § 12188 (2008) (stating that a person who claims discrimination in a place of 
public accommodation [under Title III of the ADA] may seek remedies under 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a-3 [Civil Actions for Preventive Relief]). 
200. See supra Part V. 
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stigma surrounding HIV I AIDS and reproduction has contributed to 
potential public health dangers. 201 Fearing judgment, women with 
HIV I AIDS still feel discouraged from taking precautions to prevent 
partner and perinatal transmission.202 They therefore might forego 
seeking proper medical care, increasing the chance of transmitting 
HIV. 
Looking forward, courts may well interpret the ADAAA broadly, 
as Congress intended. If they do so, the law surrounding HIVIAIDS 
and discrimination will become a more constructive force for 
changing the perception of women with HIV I AIDS who choose to 
reproduce. Despite their physical impairment, these women should 
be able to exist in a reality where they are not "substantially limited" 
in making reproductive choices free from stigma. Legal changes will 
hopefully lead to a wider acceptance of women's reproductive 
choices, allowing them to emerge from marginalized communities 
and to live empowered lives. 
201. See supra Part IV. 
202. See supra Parts Ill, V. 
